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1  | INTRODUCTION
One of the explanations for the evolution of altruism is the so‐
called green‐beard mechanism (Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1964). In 
this concept, a single gene or several tightly linked genes encoding 
altruistic behavior need to meet three requirements: (a) cause its 
bearer to behave altruistically, (b) display an observable and dis‐
tinctive trait (the "green beard"), and (c) recognize the signal and 
modify the behavior accordingly (Dawkins, 1976; Keller & Ross, 
1998; Queller, 2008). An allele causing altruism has the capacity 
to recognize individuals with copies of itself, helping the individu‐
als that carry them, and thus helping to propagate itself (Dawkins, 
1976; Grafen, 1998). Therefore, the altruistic behavior of an individ‐
ual is just a result of the selfish behavior of the green‐beard gene 
(Dawkins, 1976).
A problem with the green‐beard effect is that any mutant alleles 
that produce the advertising trait without providing the helping be‐
havior—a cheater—will cause its bearer to have higher fitness and 
will, therefore, be selected for (Gardner & West, 2010). To avoid 
this, it is assumed that both the signaling and the altruistic trait must 
be encoded by the same gene or a set of very tightly linked genes. 
Therefore, so‐called "green beards" are predicted to be rare.
Despite the initial skepticism about whether such situations 
occur in nature, green‐beard‐like genes have been documented in 
different species. Keller and Ross (1998) discovered a green‐beard 
gene in the red fire ant, Solenopsis invicta, where a linked set of al‐
leles causes workers to kill homozygous queens that lack the green‐
beard allele, while not killing individuals that contain it. Workers 
appear to distinguish between carriers and noncarriers by a transfer‐
able odor cue (Grafen, 1998; Keller & Ross, 1998). The "green beard" 
is a chemical carried on the queens' cuticle. Keller and Ross (1998) 
showed that all components of a green‐beard effect are present—a 
detectable phenotypic feature, the ability to recognize the feature, 
and differential responses toward individuals with and without the 
feature. Moreover, all these features are mediated by a group of 
closely linked genes.
Another example of green‐beard scenario comes from yeast 
(Smukalla et al., 2008). Flocculation is a formation of flocs of flakes 
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Abstract
The green‐beard effect is one proposed mechanism predicted to underpin the evolu‐
tion of altruistic behavior. It relies on the recognition and the selective help of altru‐
ists to each other in order to promote and sustain altruistic behavior. However, this 
mechanism has often been dismissed as unlikely or uncommon, as it is assumed that 
both the signaling trait and altruistic trait need to be encoded by the same gene or 
through tightly linked genes. Here, we use models of indirect genetic effects (IGEs) 
to find the minimum correlation between the signaling and altruistic trait required 
for the evolution of the latter. We show that this correlation threshold depends on 
the strength of the interaction (influence of the green beard on the expression of the 
altruistic trait), as well as the costs and benefits of the altruistic behavior. We further 
show that this correlation does not necessarily have to be high and support our ana‐
lytical results by simulations.
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of yeast that helps to protect them from the damage from chemicals, 
for instance, alcohol. Flocculation is caused by a protein, a product 
of the gene FLO1. Cells that make this protein have to pay a cost: 
They grow more slowly than cells that do not express it. However, 
only cells expressing FLO1 can stay inside of the floc. Even though 
some of these cells on the outer side of the floc die, those inside the 
floc survive and pass the altruistic gene to the next generation. Cells 
without the FLO1 gene do not form flocs and die if exposed to harsh 
chemicals.
While several modelling approaches have been developed to 
study the evolution of altruism (mainly based on game theory), we 
find that a quantitative genetics framework based on indirect ge‐
netic effects is ideally suited to model the green‐beard scenario. 
Indirect genetic effect models are based on the premise that trait 
expression is influenced not only by an individual's own genes (di‐
rect genetic effects – DGEs) but also by genes expressed in social 
partners—indirect genetic effects (IGEs) (Agrawal, Brodie, & Wade, 
2001; Cheverud, 1984; Dickerson, 1947; Moore, Brodie, & Wolf, 
1997; Wolf, 2000; Wolf, Brodie, Cheverud, Moore, & Wade, 1998; 
Wolf, Brodie, & Moore, 1999). They have received significant inter‐
est in the past few years, especially in the context of the evolution 
of social behaviors (Akçay & Van Cleve, 2012; Bijma, 2010b; Bijma, 
Muir, Ellen, Wolf, & Arendonk, 2007a; Bijma Muir & Arendonk, 
2007b; Hadfield & Thomson, 2017; McGlothlin & Brodie, 2009; 
McGlothlin, Moore, Wolf, & Brodie, 2010; McGlothlin, Wolf, 
Brodie, & Moore, 2014; Muir, 2005; Trubenová & Hager, 2012). 
One of the major advantages of IGE models is that they are based 
on parameters that can be readily determined (Bijma, 2010a; 
McGlothlin & Brodie, 2009). Here, we show that these models are 
ideally suited to the analysis of green‐beard effects because the 
signaling–recognition mechanism in green beards is, by definition, 
captured by IGEs. The IGE models thus allow easy formalization 
of the green‐beard scenario based on measurable parameters, 
such as the strength of selection and interaction strength (Bijma, 
2010a; McGlothlin & Brodie, 2009) and allow to express benefit 
and cost for the interactants in these terms.
McGlothlin et al. (2010) briefly investigated the green‐beard sce‐
nario using IGE models and showed the conditions for altruism to 
evolve, in different scenarios: (a) when individuals assort randomly 
with respect to the signaling trait (a badge), and there is no genetic 
correlation between the traits, and when they assort nonrandomly, 
(b) with or (c) without the genetic correlation between the signaling 
and the altruistic trait. As the authors pointed out, the evolution of 
badge‐based altruism is unlikely without any genetic covariance be‐
tween the behavior and the signaling traits. Here, we build on their 
model and complement their results by investigating the fourth sce‐
nario: when individuals assort randomly (no relatedness), but there 
is a genetic correlation between the traits. We use an IGE model 
to specifically focus on the correlation between the signaling and 
altruistic trait required for the evolution of the latter. We argue that 
altruistic traits can evolve and persist even in random populations of 
unrelated individuals if the correlation between the signaling and al‐
truistic trait is above a given threshold. We show that this correlation 
threshold depends on the strength of the interaction (influence of 
the green beard on the expression of the altruistic trait), as well as 
the strength of social and nonsocial selection and support our ana‐
lytical results with agent‐based simulations.
2  | IGE MODEL
To analyze the sufficient correlation between traits in the green‐
beard scenario, we will use the multivariate model describing the 
phenotype of the focal individual (McGlothlin et al., 2010)
where zi and ai are column vectors describing phenotypes and 
genotypes (additive genetic values) of the focal individual, respec‐
tively, e is a vector of residual values (environmental influences), 
and z′ denotes the mean phenotype of the focal individual's social 
partners in a group of size N. The square matrix 횿 describes IGEs. 
Note that IGEs can be affected by interactions among individuals 
in a nonlinear way, described in (Trubenová & Hager, 2012), and 
capture epistasis.
We assume that the fitness of the focal individual is not only a 
function of its own phenotype, but is also affected by the pheno‐
types of others. The effect of an individual's own phenotype on its 
own fitness is described by a nonsocial selection gradient βN (Lande, 
1979; Lande & Arnold, 1983; Moore et al., 1997), while the effect of 
interactant phenotypes on the focal individual's fitness is captured 
by a social selection gradient βS (Agrawal, 2001; Bijma & Wade, 
2008; McGlothlin et al., 2010; Queller, 1992; Westneat, 2012; Wolf 
et al., 1999). Both selection gradients are column vectors with each 
(1)zi=ai+e+ (N−1)횿z
�,
F I G U R E  1   Scheme of the model. Individuals (green circles) 
interact (arrows) with each other within the group (black circles), 
but not between groups. Groups are of the same size and 
population (black square) size is constant
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element quantifying the fitness effect of a corresponding pheno‐
typic trait. We further assume that groups are of the same size and 
the individuals do not interact between groups (Figure 1).
Following previous IGE models (Bijma & Wade, 2008; McGlothlin 
et al., 2010; Wolf et al., 1999), we define individual fitness as
where the column vector βN is a nonsocial selection gradient describing 
the effect of an individual's traits on its own fitness, βS is a social selec‐
tion gradient describing the effects of other traits on the fitness of the 
focal individual (Lande & Arnold, 1983; Frank, 1997; Wolf et al., 1999; 
McGlothlin et al., 2010, and α is a positive constant.
The genotypic response to selection Δ ̄̄a is defined as the dif‐
ference between the mean genotypic value of offspring and the 
mean genotypic value of the parental generation. To determine 
the genetic response to selection, we adapted the expression de‐
rived by (McGlothlin et al., 2010, equation 18) for a case of a pop‐
ulation with equally sized, nonoverlapping groups of N individuals. 
The authors derived an expression for the phenotypic response 
to selection (change between the mean phenotypic value of off‐
spring and the mean phenotypic value of the parental generation) 
as Δ ̄̄z=
[
[I− (N−1)횿]−1
]
Δ ̄̄a. Thus, omitting the factor 
[
I− (N−1)횿
]−1 
leads to the genotypic response to selection
where N is the group size, r is relatedness between individuals, and G is 
an additive variance—covariance matrix (Lande, 1979).
3  | ANALYTICAL RESULTS
We apply the above‐described IGE model to the green‐beard sce‐
nario. We consider two traits of interest: a signaling trait and an al‐
truistic trait (zs and za, respectively), encoded by their corresponding 
genes (genotype a = [as, aa]
T). We further assume that the genotypic 
values are normally distributed around 0. The presence of a green 
beard (a signalling trait) positively enhances the expression of altru‐
ism in social partners, which can be captured in matrix form as 
횿=
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0 0
Ψ 0
⎤⎥⎥⎦ where Ψ>0. The altruistic behavior (phenotype) of 
each individual is given by the genotypic value of its altruistic trait 
(or, rather, "predisposition to altruistic behavior") mediated by the 
signaling of its social partners (Equation 1).
While the signaling trait has no direct influence on the fitness 
of any individual, the altruistic trait increases the direct fitness of 
others (social selection) and decreases the fitness of its bearer (non‐
social selection). Thus, we can write social selection and nonsocial 
selection gradients as βS = [0, βS]
T and βN = [0, βN]
T, respectively, 
where βS > 0 and βN < 0. The altruistic behavior is not directed at a 
specific individual—all social partners experience the same behavior 
from a particular individual.
As in randomly formed groups, the relatedness between inter‐
acting individuals is expected to be r = 0, the response to selection 
(Equation 3) is simplified to
Filling in 횿, βS, and βS for our specific scenario allows further sim‐
plification (Appendix A) and leads to
where G11 = var(as) is the genotypic variance of the signaling trait, 
G22 = var(aa) is the genotypic variance of the altruistic trait, and 
G12 = G21 is the covariance between the two. For the altruistic trait 
to evolve, the response to selection of this trait must be positive, 
yielding the condition
As the correlation coefficient is defined as 휌= G12√
G11G22
, we can ex‐
press a threshold correlation coefficient between signaling and al‐
truistic traits necessary for the latter to evolve
Note that as βN has a negative sign, the threshold correlation coef‐
ficient is positive if Ψ is positive. If Ψ is negative, the correlation must be 
negative, and below the threshold. However, altruism can still evolve.
Figure 2 shows the dependence of the correlation between traits 
necessary for the evolution of altruism, for different interaction 
strength Ψ and social selection strength βS. If this threshold is higher 
than 1, it means that the altruistic behavior cannot evolve in this 
particular circumstances (parameter space).
4  | SIMULATION RESULTS
We support our analytical results discussed in the main manuscript 
with agent‐based simulations carried out in MATLAB and Python.
We ran agent‐based simulations of mN individuals randomly as‐
sorted into m groups consisting of N individuals each. Initial genotypic 
(2)Wi=훼+zTj 훽N+ (N−1)z
�T훽S
(3)
Δ ̄̄a=G
[
I− (N−2)횿T+ r(N−1)횿T
] [
I− (N−2)횿T− (N−1)횿T횿T
]−1
𝛽N
+(N−1)G(rI+횿T)
[
I− (N−2)횿T− (N−1)횿T횿T
]−1
𝛽s
(4)
Δ ̄̄a=G[I− (N−2)횿T][I− (N−2)횿T− (N−1)횿T횿T]−1𝛽N
+(N−1)G횿
T
[I− (N−2)횿T− (N−1)횿T횿T]−1𝛽s.
(5)
=
⎡⎢⎢⎣
G11,G12
G21,G22
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0
훽N
⎤⎥⎥⎦+ (N−1)
⎡⎢⎢⎣
G11,G12
G21,G22
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0,Ψ
0,0
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0
훽N
⎤⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎣
(N−1)훽SΨG11+훽NG21
(N−1)훽SΨG12+훽NG22
⎤⎥⎥⎦
=G훽N+ (N−1)G횿
T
훽S
(6)((N−1)𝛽S휳G12+𝛽NG22)>0.
(7)휌T=
−훽N
(N−1)훽SΨ
√
var(aa)
var(as)
.
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values of both the signaling and the altruistic genes are drawn from 
the bivariate normal distribution with mean of 0, standard deviation 
of 1/3, and specified correlation between the two. The altruistic be‐
havior (phenotype) of each individual is given by the genotypic value 
of its altruistic gene (predisposition to altruistic behavior), as well as 
by the level of signaling of its social partners (Equation 1). The fitness 
of each individual is calculated using Equation 2. The population size 
remains constant, and the individuals contributing to the next gen‐
eration are selected randomly with probability proportional to their 
fitness. We assume asexual populations with no recombination and 
no new mutations. The new generation of individuals is reshuffled 
and randomly assigned to groups.
4.1 | Response to selection
Equation 4 shows that the response to selection of both traits de‐
pends linearly on indirect genetic effects Ψ as well as on the strength 
of selection (both social and nonsocial) and the correlations between 
both the traits. This analytical result is supported by simulations, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.
To support our analytical derivation of the minimal correlation 
necessary for increasing the genotypic value of the altruistic gene, 
we simulated a population of 50 groups consisting of 15 interacting 
individuals each, for a range of correlation values between the sig‐
naling and the altruistic trait. The response to selection is calculated 
as the difference between the mean genotypic values of the parental 
and the offspring generations. The mean response to selection for 
each parameter set was calculated from 100 trials. The results of 
the simulations displayed in Figure 4 show that if the correlation is 
below the required threshold, the mean response to selection is neg‐
ative, while if the correlation is above the threshold, the response is 
positive, as predicted by our theoretical results. This means that the 
mean genetic value of the altruistic gene (predisposition to altruistic 
behavior) has increased in the offspring generation. See Appendix 
B, Figure B1 for additional simulations of different parameter sets.
4.2 | Long‐term evolution
To simulate long‐term evolution, we simulated evolving populations 
for 500 generations, for various m (number of groups) and N (group 
size). As expected, after some time, fixation occurred, and genetic 
variance was lost from the population. Figure 5 shows the simulation 
F I G U R E  2   Threshold correlation between altruistic and 
signaling traits. The correlation 휌 necessary for the evolution of 
altruism in green beards depends on both interaction strength Ψ 
and the social selection gradient β. The stronger the interaction 
or social selection gradient, the lower the necessary correlation 
between the signaling and altruistic trait. However, when these are 
too low, the altruistic trait cannot evolve as the required threshold 
is higher than the maximum possible correlation. βN	=	−1,	genetic	
variances of both traits are equal
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results: evolving mean genotypic and phenotypic values of both traits, 
decreasing genetic variances, and correlation between the traits and 
the number of unique haplotypes for various m and N (average of 20 
trials for each parameter set). We observed that even in cases when 
the mean genotypic value of the altruistic trait decreased, the overall 
expression of altruistic behavior increased due to the increased signal‐
ing genotypic values. See Appendix B, Figure B2 for additional simula‐
tions of different parameter sets.
To investigate the stability of the evolved altruistic population, 
we let the population evolve for 500 generation and then introduced 
a single individual with a high genetic value of the signaling, but a low 
value of altruistic trait—a cheater. We simulated the population for 
another 500 generations and recorded whether the cheater haplo‐
type invaded the population or was eradicated. We varied the group 
size N, number of groups m, and the initial correlation 휌 between the 
signaling and the altruistic trait. Invasion rate is calculated from 200 
independent trials, and mean invasion rate and standard deviation 
are calculated from 50 repeats of 200 evolution trials for each pa‐
rameter set. Figure 6 shows the results of the simulations. We ob‐
served that while the initial correlation between the traits did not 
have any observable impact, the rate of invasions decreased with 
increasing number of groups. This could be expected, as the fixation 
probability of an allele decreases with the overall population size 
mN. However, this trend was not so clear with increasing group size, 
as the invasion rate slightly increased at the beginning.
5  | DISCUSSION
Most population genetics, as well as game theoretic models ana‐
lyzing the evolution of altruism assume a binary division of phe‐
notypes (and genotypes as well): altruists and cheaters. While 
undoubtedly helpful, the biological reality surely differs—most 
complex and social traits, such as altruistic behavior, are not bi‐
nary but expressed on continuous scales and the environment 
likely mediates their expression. IGE models are naturally set up to 
deal with such situations, offering more realistic insight into many 
aspects of social behavior. Several social interactions can be for‐
malized and analyzed by these models as easily as the green‐beard 
scenario. Recently, models of social evolution with continuous 
traits have been developed Mullon, Keller, and Lehmann (2016), 
but these are still rare. Even rarer are the models of social evolu‐
tion that consider multiple traits, as we did in our model. Below, 
we discuss the main finding of our analysis.
It should be noted, that our approach to study green‐beard 
scenario is limited by the assumption of mediated, but nondis‐
criminate altruism toward an individual's social partners. Each 
individual's level of altruism is determined by its group, and all 
social partners experience the same benefit from a given indi‐
vidual. However, the same individual would behave differently in 
a different group. Therefore, it is rather a "group's green beard" 
than an "individual's green beard" that plays a role, and thus, it 
could be argued that our model is not the green‐beard model as 
originally suggested by Dawkins. One possibility to use IGEs while 
tending to this problem is to consider sequential pairwise interac‐
tions between individuals, rather than a simultaneous interaction 
(J.	McGlothlin,	personal	communication).
5.1 | Correlation threshold
McGlothlin et al. (2010) derived conditions for altruism to evolve in 
three different scenarios. First, the authors showed that in a case 
when individuals assort to groups randomly (i.e., the relatedness 
is zero) and there is no genetic correlation between the signaling 
F I G U R E  4   Response to selection depends on the correlation between altruistic and signaling traits. Comparison of analytical solution 
and simulations, when βN	=	−1	and	βS = 1. Dots are results of simulations, mean of 100 trials. Lines represent analytical predictions. Blue dots 
and lines represent response to selection of the signaling trait, while the response of the altruistic trait is shown in red. Green lines represent 
axes. The purple lines show the analytically calculated minimal correlation between the traits required for the altruistic trait to evolve
(a) (b)
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and the altruistic trait; the strength of interaction Ψ would have 
to be very strong in comparison with the strength of nonsocial 
selection. Then, the authors assumed that individuals assort non‐
randomly with respect to the signaling trait, with or without the 
genetic correlation, which lessened the condition on the strength 
of interaction. In this manuscript, we complement their results, 
and we explicitly assume that groups are formed randomly (the 
relatedness is zero) and show that altruism can still evolve, even 
if both interaction strength Ψ and selection strength βS are of the 
same magnitude.
Using IGE models, we were able to determine the necessary cor‐
relation between the signaling and the altruistic trait for the latter 
to evolve (Equation 7). We show how this threshold depends both 
on interaction strength and selection gradients (Figure 2). This cor‐
relation threshold increases with the increasing cost associated with 
the altruistic behavior (negative nonsocial selection gradient), and 
decreases with the interaction strength, as well as with the posi‐
tive social selection experienced by the recipients of the altruistic 
behavior. However, for small values of both interaction strength Ψ 
and selection strength βS (relative to negative nonsocial selection) 
the response to selection is always negative, even if both traits are 
completely correlated (essentially encoded by the same locus).
While we are not aware of any other study investigating the cor‐
relation between the signaling and the altruistic trait in the green‐
beard scenario, Kirkpatrick and Barton (1997) obtained very similar 
results when investigating the evolution of female mating prefer‐
ence. The authors derived an expression for the genetic correlation 
between the male's signaling trait and female preference. While the 
authors did not use an IGE framework, the expression they derived 
closely matches Equation 7. This is not surprising, as both situations 
bear strong similarities: both the green beard and the male signaling 
trait do not directly contribute to an individual's fitness, but enhance 
F I G U R E  5   Long‐term evolution for different parameter sets. Blue represents the signaling trait, while the altruistic trait is shown in red. 
Lines represent means and shaded areas standard deviation. All simulations: βS = 1, βN	=	−1,	N = 15, m = 50. Column a: 휌 = .0, Ψ = 1. Column 
b: 휌 = .6, Ψ = 1. Column c: 휌	=	−.3,	Ψ = 1. Column d: 휌 = .6, Ψ = .01. Column e: 휌 = .6, Ψ = .1. Means are calculated from 20 independent long‐
term trials
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
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traits in others (altruistic behavior or the willingness to mate) that 
have direct fitness consequences.
5.2 | Response to selection
Equation 4 offers more profound insight into the forces shaping the 
evolution of altruistic behavior and the signaling trait. The second 
term of the response to selection of the altruistic trait βN var(aa) de‐
scribes the direct adverse effect of an altruistic trait on the fitness of 
its carrier. However, if the correlation between the signaling and al‐
truistic trait is strong enough, it may be compensated by the indirect 
response to selection, described by the first term (N−1)훽SΨcov(aaas).
The first term (N−1)훽SΨvar(as) in Equation 4 shows that the in‐
teraction Ψ induces a positive response to selection in the signaling 
trait—the high values of signaling genes are rewarded through elic‐
iting altruistic behaviors from other, leading to positive correlation 
between genotypic values and fitness. As McGlothlin et al. (2010) 
pointed out, both traits will tend to run away together. However, this 
effect is partially opposed by the second term βNcov(aaas), describ‐
ing the indirect response to selection, which has an adverse fitness 
effect due to the correlation with altruistic behavior. Thus, while the 
correlation between traits enhances the evolution of an altruistic 
trait, it slows down the evolution of the signaling trait. Because IGEs 
are associated with the altruistic trait and not the genetic correlation 
between the two, the signaling trait evolves in a positive direction.
Our agent‐based simulations support the analytical results for 
the correlation threshold. While the response to selection in a par‐
ticular population greatly varies, the mean response closely matched 
the predicted values for given correlations. For correlations above 
the predicted threshold, the mean response of the altruistic trait is 
positive, meaning that the offspring's mean genotypic value for al‐
truistic behavior has increased. The mean genotypic value of the sig‐
naling trait also increased, for any value of correlation. However, the 
response decreased with the increasing correlation, as suggested 
by Equation 4. As above, this is because the higher values of the 
signaling trait are associated with the higher values of the costly al‐
truistic trait.
The manifestation of the altruistic trait (phenotype) depends 
highly on the population structure and the level of signaling. 
Interestingly, we observed that even for some parameter sets, where 
the mean genotypic value of the altruistic trait evolved toward neg‐
ative values, the mean phenotypic value of altruistic behavior was 
positive and increasing. This was caused by the evolution of the sig‐
naling trait—higher signaling levels increased altruistic behavior, even 
though the genotypic values evolved in the opposite direction. This 
points to the importance of distinguishing between the genotypic 
response to selection derived here, and the phenotypic response to 
selection derived by McGlothlin et al. (2010). The phenomenon of 
opposite responses to selection was recently investigated by Fisher 
and Pruitt (2019). Among other reasons, the authors concluded that 
they typically occur when social selection opposes direct selection, 
as happens in our case.
In our model, the expression of the altruistic trait depends on the 
overall (absolute) level of signaling, meaning that more social partners 
would elicit more altruistic behavior from the focal individual. In such 
a case, whether the individual behaves altruistically or not depends 
on the size of the group it belongs to. However, it would also be rea‐
sonable to assume that the altruistic response depends on the mean, 
rather than the absolute level of signaling in the group. In such a case, 
group size would not affect the expression of the trait, and we would 
not observe the discrepancy between the signs of the phenotypic 
and genotypic response to selection. In other words, if the mean, not 
the absolute level of signaling determines the expression of the altru‐
istic trait, the phenotypic and genotypic response to selection should 
be in the same direction (Appendix B). The most realistic model would 
be somewhere in between these two extremes: The level of signal‐
ing would be partially "diluted" by the increasing number of social 
partners. However, introducing such "dilution coefficient" would add 
complexity to our model. We leave the investigation of how the level 
of dilution would affect the correlation threshold for further studies.
F I G U R E  6   Invasion rate depends on the group, as well as population size. With increasing number of groups (fixed N = 10), cheaters 
invasion rate was decreasing. However, this trend was not obvious for the increasing group size (fixed m = 10), where the invasion rate 
peaked at N = 10. Blue line–initial correlation 휌 = 0, red line 휌 = .45 and blue line 휌 = .9. Means and standard deviation calculated from 50 
repeats with 200 independent trials for each parameter set
(a) (b)
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5.3 | Long‐term evolution
A positive response to selection in one generation does not guaran‐
tee the long‐term increase in the level of altruism, as the correlation 
between the traits will also develop with the evolution of the traits. 
Our simulations of long‐term evolution suggest that the response to 
selection is positive for a number of generations if the initial correla‐
tion is above the calculated threshold (Equation 7). The mean geno‐
typic values of both traits increase, as does the overall expression 
of the altruistic behavior. After a while, the increase flattens up and 
reaches a stable level. The genetic variance of both traits decreases, 
as does the correlation between both traits. This is not surprising—as 
we consider no new mutations and no recombination, we soon run 
out of variance, with only one haplotype present in the population. 
Incorporating diploidy, sexual reproduction, and recombination into 
the model would likely lead to more restrictive conditions for the 
evolution of altruism.
Interestingly, mean phenotypic values are increasing even for 
correlations below the threshold, and even when the mean geno‐
typic value is negative, the mean phenotypic value can be positive. 
This is because the expression of the trait is strongly determined by 
Ψ and driven by the evolution of the signaling trait.
Jansen	 and	 van	 Baalen	 (2006)	 investigated	 a	 more	 general	
case of a green‐beard scenario—where not only green, but multi‐
ple different beard colors exist, with altruistic individuals helping 
only those with the same beard color (beard chromodynamics). The 
authors observed that strong coupling between the signaling trait 
and the altruistic beard leads to fixation of a single colour and even‐
tual crash of the altruistic population when cheaters emerge. On 
the other hand, when the coupling was loose, the fixation did not 
occur—instead, several groups of different colors coexisted. When 
cheaters of the same colour invaded a population of altruists, the 
population of a particular colour declined and was taken over by 
another	group	of	altruistic	individuals.	Jansen	and	van	Baalen	(2006)	
suggest these cycles could repeat indefinitely, stabilizing in boom‐
bust dynamics.
In our model, there is no binary division of phenotypes between 
altruists and cheaters, and the genotypic values of both traits are 
continuous and mediated by the phenotypes of social partners. 
Furthermore, altruistic behavior is mediated by the phenotypes of 
social partners but is nondiscriminatory—every social partner experi‐
ences the same benefit from a particular individual. However, "cheat‐
ers" can be simulated as individuals that have high genetic values for 
the signaling trait, but low genetic values of the altruistic trait.
While	the	Janssen	and	Goldstone	(2006)	model	 is	different	from	
ours, some of the conclusions can be compared between the models. 
In our model, the strong correlation between the traits also leads to 
quick fixation. However, we did not observe any effect of the initial 
correlation on the probability of cheater invasion. This is not surpris‐
ing, as, after 500 generations, only one haplotype was left in the pop‐
ulation in every trial. Furthermore, we observed that the increasing 
number of groups had a negative impact on the invasion rate. This is 
also to be expected, as the probability of fixation of a new mutation is 
inversely proportional to the size of the population. However, increas‐
ing the group size first lead to an increased invasion rate, then to a 
decreased rate. The peak of the invasion rate was observed when the 
number of individuals within one group was the same as the number 
of groups. This might be caused by the increased benefits that the 
cheater receives in bigger groups, partially compensating for the de‐
creasing fixation probability.
The utility of the IGE models has been highlighted numer‐
ous times (Bijma & Aanen, 2010; Bijma, Muir, Ellen, et al., 2007a; 
Bijma, Muir, & Van Arendonk, 2007b; Hadfield & Thomson, 2017; 
McGlothlin et al., 2010, 2014; Nonacs & Hager, 2010; Wilson, 2013). 
In this study, we used IGE models to shed new light on the notorious 
problem of green‐beard scenarios. We have shown that even if the 
green beard and the altruistic behavior are not encoded by the same 
gene, altruistic behavior can evolve if the correlation between the 
genotypic values of both traits is sufficiently high.
We complemented our analytical results with agent‐based simu‐
lations and confirmed that even in the long term, altruistic behavior 
can evolve though the green‐beard mechanism and persist in the 
population. Furthermore, our simulations show that such altruistic 
populations can be reasonably resistant to the invasion of cheaters. 
However, we did not assume any recombination between the traits, 
which could increase the probability of cheaters invading. This, as 
well as other possible extensions including variable population sizes 
and mutation events, still need to be investigated.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE ANALYTICAL RESULTS IN THE GREEN‐
BEARD SCENARIO
We consider two traits of interest: a signaling and an altruistic trait 
(zs and za, respectively), encoded by their corresponding genes (as 
and aa, respectively). The presence of a green beard (a signaling trait) 
positively alters the expression of altruism in social partners, which 
can be captured in matrix form as 횿=
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0 0
Ψ 0
⎤⎥⎥⎦ where Ψ> 0. The 
altruistic trait increases the direct fitness of others but decreases the 
fitness of its bearer, while the signaling trait has no direct influence 
on the fitness of any individual: βS = [0, βS] and βN = [0, βN], respec‐
tively, where βS > 0 and βN < 0.
In randomly formed groups, relatedness between interacting indi‐
viduals is r = 0. Thus, using Equation 3, we can express the response 
to selection:
Filling in 횿, βS and βS for the green‐beard scenario leads to
as 횿횿T gives a zero matrix. This further simplifies to
that can also be expressed as (but only for these parameters)
where G11 = var (as) is the genotypic variance of the signaling 
trait, G22 = var (aa) is the genotypic variance of the altruistic trait and 
G12 = G21 is the covariance between the two.
APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL SIMULATIONS
We support our analytical results discussed in the main manuscript 
with agent‐based simulations carried out in MATLAB or Python.
Each trial begins by generating a population consisting of m 
groups of N individuals. Genotypic values of both the signaling 
and the altruistic trait are drawn from the normal distribution with 
mean set to 0 and standard deviation to 1/3. Individual phenotypes 
and fitness are calculated according to the genotypes (and pheno‐
types) of their social partners. The fitness of each individual is cal‐
culated using Equation 2. A new generation is created from the old 
one by randomly drawing MN individuals from the old generation 
with the probability proportional to their fitness. The new genera‐
tion of individuals is reshuffled and randomly assigned to groups.
To support our analytical derivation of the minimal correlation 
necessary for the altruistic trait to evolve, we calculated the mean 
response to selection for a range of correlation values as an average 
of 100 independent trials for each parameter set (each data point). 
The response to selection in each trial was calculated as the differ‐
ence between the mean genotypic value of the offspring and the 
parental generation. The simulations were carried out in Python. 
Figure B1 shows the results of simulations for various parameter 
sets.
Figure B2 shows additional simulations of long‐term evolution for 
various parameter sets. We simulated 20 trials for each parameter 
set.
(A1)
Δ ̄̄a=G[I− (N−2)횿T][I− (N−2)횿T− (N−1)횿T횿T]−1𝛽N
+(N−1)G횿
T
[I− (N−2)횿T− (N−1)횿T횿T]−1𝛽s.
=
⎡⎢⎢⎣
G11,G12
G21,G22
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
1,− (N−2)Ψ
0,1
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
1,− (N−2)Ψ
0,1
⎤⎥⎥⎦
−1 ⎡⎢⎢⎣
0
훽N
⎤⎥⎥⎦
+(N−1)
⎡⎢⎢⎣
G11,G12
G21,G22
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0,Ψ
0,0
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
1,− (N−2)Ψ
0,1
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0
훽N
⎤⎥⎥⎦
(A2)
=
⎡⎢⎢⎣
G11,G12
G21,G22
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0
훽N
⎤⎥⎥⎦+ (n−1)
⎡⎢⎢⎣
G11,G12
G21,G22
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0,Ψ
0,0
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0
훽N
⎤⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎣
(N−1)훽SΨG11+훽NG21
(N−1)훽SΨG12+훽NG22
⎤⎥⎥⎦
(A3)=G훽N+ (N−1)G횿
T
훽S
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F I G U R E  B 1   Response to selection depends on the correlation between altruistic and signaling traits. Comparison of analytical solution 
and simulations, when βN	=	−1	and	βS = 1. Dots are results of simulations; lines are analytical predictions. Blue dots and lines represent the 
response to selection of the signaling trait, while the response of the altruistic trait is shown in red. Green lines represent axes. The purple 
lines show the analytically calculated minimal correlation between the traits required for the altruistic trait to evolve. Means are calculated 
from 100 independent trials
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
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F I G U R E  B 2   Long‐term evolution for different parameter sets. Blue represents the signaling trait, while the altruistic trait is shown in red. 
Lines represent means and shaded areas standard deviation. All simulations: βS = 1, βN	=	−1,	N = 15, m = 50. Column a: 휌 = .9, Ψ = 1. Column b: 
휌 = .3, Ψ = .3. Column c: 휌 = 0, Ψ = .3. Column d: 휌 = .3, Ψ = .01. Column e: 휌 = .9, Ψ = .1. Means are calculated from 20 independent long‐term 
trials
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a)
